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Abstract 
Using volunteer writing for Mass Observation, we explore how British citizens decided 
whether to leave the EU. The 2016 referendum was the biggest decision made by the British 
electorate in decades, but involved limited voter analysis. Many citizens did not have strong 
views about EU membership in early 2016. The campaigns did not help to firm up their views, 
not least because so much information appeared to be in dispute. Voters, often characterised as 
polarised, were reluctant and uncertain. Many citizens took their duty to decide seriously, but 
were driven more by hunch than careful analysis. In 2016, voters reacted against elites they did 
not trust at least as much as they embraced the ideas of trusted elites. This contrasts with the 
1975 Referendum on the Common Market, when the vote was driven by elite endorsement. In 
low-trust contexts, voters use cues from elites as negative rather than positive stimulus. 
 
1) Introduction 
In the period since the EU Referendum of 2016, we have learned a lot about what people 
thought of the EU, Brexit, and related issues, and how this varied by locality, social group, and 
attitude to other issues (Clarke et al 2017a, 2017b, Curtice 2016, Goodwin and Heath 2016, 
Goodwin and Milazzo 2017, Hobolt 2016, Lee et al 2018). However, we have learned rather 
less about how people thought of these things; how they formed opinions in response to 
requests from politicians and pollsters, and how they came to decisions as voters in the period 
leading up to the referendum. This article aims to fill this gap using evidence collected by the 
Mass Observation Project. 
We begin by emphasising the unique contribution of Mass Observation (MO) 
collections. The letters and diaries collected from panellists over a period of months in the run-
up to the vote allow researchers to explore how opinion and decision-making develops over 
time. Other qualitative methods such as focus groups allow us to explore the immediate 
thinking of participants, but MO data make visible the development of thinking. 
The results of our study make up the bulk of the article. The MO panellists behave in a 
way that is in tune with much public opinion research largely drawn from survey work. They 
are rather vague and uncertain in their deliberations about the issues at stake. They often 
develop opinions reluctantly, hesitantly, uncertainly, out of a sense of duty as citizens, and in 
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response to surveys, ballots, and associated campaigns. In developing these opinions, 
campaigns often don’t help when they are characterised by claim and counter-claim, and take 
place in a context of low political trust. In developing opinions, therefore, the MO panellists 
often fall back on feelings and elite cues. Indeed, our evidence supports the argument that 
voting in the EU Referendum was less an expression of polarisation and more an awkward 
journey. Our findings encourage caution regarding claims that polarisation produced the 
conditions for the referendum and the closely divided result (Ford and Goodwin 2017, 
Goodhart 2017, Norris and Inglehart 2019). They support the counter argument that 
polarisation was produced by the referendum and associated campaign, outcome, and aftermath 
(Curtice 2018, Hobolt et al 2020) – and may fade unless restimulated. 
Another main finding of the research is perhaps more surprising. MO collections 
provide evidence that voters were more uncertain than could be revealed by the forced choices 
presented in surveys. Many voters found that campaigns and the information environment 
made their task harder, rather than performing the standard role of clarifying choices and issues. 
Voters ended up using cues, as much previous research would have predicted, but often in a 
way not expected. Rather than elite cues steering voters, many citizens voted against the elites 
they least trusted and so used their distrust of politics to steer their decision-making. 
By analysing MO’s referendum diaries, we aim to advance understandings of Brexit, 
including what explains it and what might be its consequences. Primarily, though, we aim to 
advance understandings of how people form opinions and make decisions as voters, especially 
in the current period of low political trust in Britain and many other democracies (Clarke et al 
2018, Stoker 2016). Elite cues have been a particular focus of research on referendum voting 
in recent years, not least because referendums often ask citizens to decide on complex and 
unfamiliar issues (Hobolt 2006, LeDuc 2002, Nemčok et al 2019). Both elite cues and feelings 
have been much discussed in research on the Brexit vote – and before that, on Euroscepticism 
across Europe – where the most influential framework has probably been the ‘calculation, 
community, and cues’ framework of Hooghe and Marks (2005). Here, ‘calculation’ refers to 
the cost-benefit analysis of slow thinking and rational choice models, while ‘community’ refers 
to feelings of national belonging and understandings of national identity (which function as 
fast-thinking heuristics), and ‘cues’ refers to the fast-thinking heuristic of elite endorsements. 
Since the EU Referendum of 2016, this framework has been used by Hobolt (2016) and Clarke 
et al (2017b), who found the Leave vote to be explained by a combination of all three factors. 
In the sections that follow, we use MO sources to demonstrate how a context of low political 
trust in 2016 made calculation difficult for many voters in the referendum (Section 4). These 
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voters ended up basing their decisions more on vague feelings regarding beliefs, principles, 
and visions (similar to the ‘community’ of Hooghe and Marks), and cues – but negative cues, 
as opposed to the elite endorsements often focused on by studies of cue-taking (Section 5). 
King (1977) argued that elite cues were particularly important in shaping the result of 
the UK’s 1975 Referendum on the Common Market. During the 1960s and 1970s, Europe was 
not a very salient issue for voters. Opinions towards the Common Market fluctuated over time, 
which King took as an indication that such opinions were lightly held by citizens. Once the two 
main parties finally decided to support remaining in the Common Market, the majority of 
citizens fell in behind this position. King referred to this phenomenon as ‘follow the leader’. 
He noted that little ‘anti-establishment mood’ was present in Britain at the time. Voters mostly 
followed the endorsements of the main party leaders and also business leaders. In the rest of 
this article, we provide evidence that something different happened in 2016 when the vote took 
place against a background of significant anti-establishment mood in Britain. 
 
2) Approaching Mass Observation  
Mass Observation was established in 1937 to record the everyday lives of ordinary people in 
Britain (Hinton 2013). Initially, most of its commissions came from the Ministry of 
Information. Until 1965, it collected material by two general means. A team of ‘mass 
observers’ recorded observations, overhead conversations, survey responses, interview 
responses, and ephemera. A panel of volunteer writers, between 400 and 1000 strong 
(depending on the year), kept monthly diaries, completed day surveys, and replied to quarterly 
open-ended questions (called ‘directives’). In 1969, a deal was struck with the University of 
Sussex to archive the papers of this original MO. The Mass Observation Archive (MOA) was 
opened in 1975. In 1981, the Archive founded the Mass Observation Project, which revived 
the panel of volunteer writers. To this day, directives are still being sent three times a year to 
approximately 500 respondents. 
Compared to focus-group talk, often used to explore voter decision-making from a 
qualitative perspective, writing for MO is done not in public but in private. It is done not in the 
relatively structured context of one brief meeting but as part of a relatively long-term, 
unstructured, intimate correspondence between MO and its panellists. In this context, panellists 
seem prepared to write things for MO that might not get said, or said so frankly, in focus groups 
or even one-to-one interviews – for example, admissions regarding attitudes to faith or sex 
(Hinton 2013, Sheridan 1994). Furthermore, panellists often use the format of a letter when 
writing for MO, which affords more time and space for reflection and to include more detail 
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than is often provided by other formats. Perhaps most importantly for the rest of this paper, 
panellists sometimes use the format of a diary when writing for MO, especially around the time 
of elections or referendums. These diaries allow researchers to reconstruct what happens during 
political campaigns. They provide researchers with access to how citizens receive requests for 
opinions and votes, and how they respond – sometimes right up to the point of casting their 
vote. 
The observations of the original mass observers have been criticised for telling 
historians more about the prejudices of these untrained ethnographers than the opinions, values, 
and understandings of ordinary citizens (MacClancy 1995). The volunteer writing of MO 
panellists, as ‘the most unmediated layer’ of the archive (Sheridan 1994), is generally thought 
to be less open to such criticism. In what follows, we limit our focus to this volunteer writing. 
We selected two directives on Brexit from 2016 and 2017 (see Appendix A, available online). 
Panellists took between one and four months to respond in each case. The average length of 
responses was nine sides of A4. A few panellists limited their focus to the particular questions 
asked in the directives, but many panellists used the title of the directive – ‘the EU Referendum’ 
– as a prompt to write with apparent freedom about the general topic (a writing practice 
common to many MO panellists and directives – Sheridan et al 2000). Connected to this, while 
some panellists chose a letter format for their responses and sent relatively short responses (less 
than five sides, apparently written in one sitting), others chose a diary format, sending tens of 
sides in response (apparently written in multiple instalments over many weeks). 
We sampled 60 panellists for each directive, filling quotas for age group, gender, 
occupational classification, region, and Leave/Remain. The figure of 60 was enough to reach 
descriptive saturation – the most important consideration when sampling qualitative data 
(Baker and Edwards 2012). The characteristics of the panellists quoted in the sections below 
are summarised in Appendix B (available online). 
The social constitution of the original panel (1930s to 1960s) has been criticised for 
being skewed towards the radicalised lower middle class (Jeffrey 1978) or at least people from 
London and Southeast England, and people on the Left (Hinton 2013). However, findings 
generated from the original panel have been validated using findings from Gallup polls and the 
Wartime Social Survey (Goot 2008) and also the Home Intelligence Panel (Hinton 2013) – so 
these concerns should not be overplayed. Furthermore, the panel constituted since 1981 is 
widely recognised to be more representative of the British population than the original panel, 
though it remains skewed a little towards retired and middle-class people, and especially those 
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people who volunteer for a social history project, and so are particularly dutiful, engaged, 
reflexive, and critical (Hinton 2010). 
 This presence of especially engaged citizens is not particularly unusual in public 
opinion research. For example, the Inquiry into the 2015 British General Election Opinion 
Polls (Sturgis et al 2016) found people with greater than average interest in politics to be over-
represented generally in opinion polls. On the one hand, then, issues of representativeness 
should not be overemphasised with regard to MO. The current panel is diverse and contains a 
range of respondents writing from a range of positions. On the other hand, given the remaining 
limitations of the panel, how the writing of panellists is approached deserves further 
consideration. MO sources are most commonly analysed by what might be called ‘reading 
vertically’ for autobiographical life histories. This is what Dorothy Sheridan, former Director 
of the MOA, thought the panellists were constructing through writing for MO (Sheridan 1993). 
Hinton (2010, 2013) has demonstrated how the biographies of panellists can be studied and 
used to illuminate historical processes that are molecular and shaped by the choices of these 
historical agents. Hinton has also suggested, however, that volunteer writing for MO provides 
researchers with access to the cultural worlds inhabited by the panellists; the worlds of 
discourse – populated by newspapers, advice manuals, films etc. – from which people in 
particular places at particular times construct their selfhoods. 
This brings us to an alternative way of approaching MO sources, which might be called 
‘reading horizontally’ for shared cultural resources. We have described this approach at length 
elsewhere (Clarke et al 2018). It is based on the claims of cognitive science that behaviour is 
shaped by understanding, which in turn is shaped by cultural models; the claims of social 
theoretical writing on discourse that social reality is constructed from practices, which in turn 
are shaped by forms of consciousness; and the claims of interpretive social science that actions 
follow from holistic beliefs, discourses, and traditions. MO sources are read for the cultural 
resources panellists use to construct their understandings, including categories, storylines, folk 
theories, and subject positions (ibid). Examples from the present paper include the norm of 
‘responsibility to vote’ and the understanding of political campaigns as being made up of ‘claim 
and counter-claim’. This approach focuses especially on the cultural resources panellists share 
with each other and, plausibly, other citizens in their families, friendship networks, workplaces, 
and audiences for cultural products. As such, in contrast to the vertical approach, reading 
horizontally privileges generalisation over difference, complexity, and the context of individual 
panellists’ total engagements with MO. These strengths and limitations are shared with similar 
approaches taken by other researchers, for whom MO materials have disclosed ‘public and 
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shared understandings’ (Salter 2010), ‘shared cultural repertoires’ (Nettleton and Uprichard 
2011), and the ‘proverbs, truisms, and everyday episteme’ from which citizens construct and 
express opinions (Gazeley and Langhamer 2013). 
In the present paper, we follow Clarke et al (2017) in reading MO sources not only for 
shared cultural resources, but also the logical connections between phenomena they sometimes 
disclose. In the sections that follow, logical connections disclosed include those between 
demands that citizens express an opinion/vote, uncertain but dutiful citizens (Section 3), 
unhelpful campaigns (Section 4), and opinion/vote formation by recourse to feelings and elite 
cues (Section 5). 
 
3) Reluctant, uncertain, but dutiful citizens 
When asked by MO if they would vote in the 2016 referendum, most panellists responded 
positively. They would vote, but the reasons given for why they would vote and the views 
expressed about the ‘privilege’ or ‘debt’ or ‘responsibility’ of voting are interesting and worth 
discussing. Many said they would vote not because they held strong views about Britain’s 
membership of the EU, but because they held strong views about voting. A sales ledger 
controller in her 40s from Northern Ireland (C5692) wrote: ‘I will definitely be voting […] I 
personally feel very strongly that we must all vote’. A teacher in her 60s from Scotland (W729) 
would vote even though she was ‘sick’ of voting after the last few years of British politics: ‘I’m 
sick of elections for this, that, and the next thing, but I will vote because I think it’s important 
to vote’. Why was it important to vote? For many panellists, voting was viewed as a right won 
by their predecessors. ‘I vote in every election because people fought and died for this vote’, 
wrote a self-employed woman in her 40s from Northeast England (R5429). ‘I remember what 
the suffragettes did to get the vote for women’, wrote a shop assistant in her 80s from Yorkshire 
and Humber (J1890). 
Elderly women especially would reference British history and the suffragettes in their 
responses. Other panellists would give similar justifications for voting, but were more likely to 
mention the lack of voting rights elsewhere in the world at the present time. A self-employed 
professional in his 40s from Southeast England (D4736) would vote because ‘We have the 
extravagance of freedom that many others don’t have in this world; a freedom that people are 
prepared and forced to die for, and we must not squander our privilege’. A pharmacist in her 
50s from the West Midlands (V3773) would vote because ‘ordinary citizens of many countries 
still don’t have a vote’. A retired nurse in his 60s from the East Midlands (C4988) would vote 
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because ‘I feel that living in a democracy which allows us to cast a vote is a privilege and one 
that many people around the world do not get to do’. 
 This last panellist went on to write: ‘I feel the referendum was called not because there 
was a pressing need for it’. He felt it had been called by Prime Minister David Cameron for 
internal party reasons and was not alone in feeling this. Many panellists admitted to feeling 
strongly about voting, but not about EU membership and related issues. For some like this 
administrator in his 40s from the West Midlands (B3227), the issues just did not seem that 
important: ‘The key issues seem to be the economy (including jobs and prices), crime and 
terrorism, migration and border control, and independence/lack of control over our own laws. 
I can’t say I feel worked up about any of them’. For others, the issues may have been important, 
but the question asked by the referendum would do little to address them. On this, a charity 
worker in his 30s from Northeast England (J5734) wrote: ‘I don’t see a great deal at stake. 
Ultimately, I’m deciding whether a remote and unrepresentative political class in Brussels get 
to play dress-up with other people’s lives, or whether a remote and unrepresentative political 
class in London get to’. Similarly, a self-employed professional in his 40s from Southeast 
England (D4736) wrote: ‘Key issues for the UK, I believe, are immigration, sovereignty, and 
how our money is spent […] Leaving the EU is not a solution to any problem in itself, nor is 
staying […] I can honestly say that I’m not too bothered which way the referendum goes’. 
 If some panellists struggled to feel strongly about the question being asked by the 
referendum (but would vote), then others struggled to feel confident in their response to the 
question (but would vote). In the terms of Leruth and Stoker (2020), many panellists found the 
task environment of the referendum to be difficult. An apparently easy binary choice was 
presented, but regarding a seemingly difficult technical issue. One such panellist was a machine 
operator in her 20s from Northwest England (B5702). She would ‘definitely vote’, but was not 
sure she was ‘informed enough’ and was ‘not 100% sold on either side’ of the argument. 
Another was a finance manager in his 30s from Southwest England (T5672), who was ‘very 
much on the fence’ and ‘could genuinely see advantages both ways’. In the end, he voted ‘on 
balance’ and ‘after much hand-wringing’. He left his decision late, as did many other panellists. 
A retired library assistant in her 70s from the East of England (H2639) wrote that she intended 
to vote but had ‘not decided’ how. There were ‘so many issues’ and ‘so many opinions on these 
issues’. She wrote: ‘I shall definitely vote, but until I actually have the voting paper in my hand, 
I still cannot honestly decide which way I shall vote!’. Similarly, a retired nurse in her 80s from 
the East Midlands (M2061) wrote of the ‘pros and cons’ she had listened to during the first 
days of the campaign, before writing: ‘Up to now, I am in a complete fog as to which way to 
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vote’. Later in her diary, she wrote: ‘I did not make up my mind until I was in the polling 
station’. 
 The panellists quoted so far in this section were voters in the referendum, but they were 
reluctant, uncertain voters. Some did not see the referendum question as important or 
consequential. Others did not see an obviously correct answer to the question. We complete 
this section by noting that some panellists wore this position of the reluctant, uncertain voter 
with apparent ease, but others appeared to feel its weight. A shop assistant in her 80s from 
Yorkshire and Humber (J1890) wrote: ‘It is very difficult to have enough knowledge and 
information about the EU. I keep changing my mind. I hear one thing which sways my decision, 
and then I hear another point of view and it changes my mind again. It really is a very big 
responsibility’. Just before polling day, she continued: ‘The 23rd June is decision day, but I still 
don’t know what to vote […] It is a big decision and what if I make the wrong decision?’. The 
responsibility of voting weighed heavily on this panellist. Other panellists went further in 
arguing that citizens were being made responsible for something that really should have been 
the responsibility of politicians. Consider the following three quotations, first from a civil 
servant in his 50s from Southwest England (E5014), then from a self-employed woman in her 
50s from Northeast England (R5429), then from a community health worker in her 40s from 
the East Midlands (T4715): 
 
I think I will vote […] but to be honest I don’t think I really know all the 
implications of either option […] I am really annoyed that the Conservatives have 
left such an important decision to the electorate […] I see the Government as 
abdicating its responsibility to govern. 
 
I will vote […] I firmly believe this issue should not be decided by the public […] 
As a democratic country with an elected government and officials, I believe the 
issue should have been addressed by those people and consider it a ‘cop out’ by 
asking the public to sort it out for them. 
 
I will vote, even though I don’t want to have to be involved in such a monumental 
decision. The politics of this issue are very intricate and I’m finding it difficult to 
get a clear understanding of it all. Politicians are paid and elected to make these 
decisions. I know they don’t always get it right, but it should be their job to sort 




These panellists would vote in the referendum, but would do so reluctantly. They assessed 
themselves to lack sufficient knowledge and understanding for such a decision. Their folk 
theory of democracy is reminiscent of what Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) called ‘stealth 
democracy’. They saw their own democratic role as limited. They expected politicians to 
govern and take responsibility for issues like EU membership on their behalf. 
We are now a position to summarise our first claim. Many voters in the EU Referendum 
were reluctant and uncertain. They did not begin 2016 as Leavers and Remainers with strong 
opinions on British membership of the EU. They did not feel well-qualified to make a decision. 
They felt obliged to develop opinions when asked to do so, not least because of the strong 
opinions they held about voting, which they saw as a debt to be paid to the suffragettes, or a 
privilege not to be squandered. These citizens ended up voting, but often after hesitantly 
developing and changing their position over time, and without feeling confident in the final 
position they had reached. Many resented being asked to navigate such a difficult task 
environment and take responsibility for such a difficult decision. 
 Due to the constitution of the MO panel, this material does not allow us to say how 
many voters nationally were reluctant and uncertain, as described in the paragraph above, but 
we argue this position was not unusual and so should be taken seriously. The quotations used 
above are just a few examples of many such quotations in the MO material. They are not taken 
from a narrow section of society, but from men and women of all ages and all regions of the 
UK; people working as teachers, shop assistants, pharmacists, machine operators, finance 
managers, and so on; citizens who, when push came to shove, voted Leave in some cases and 
Remain in others. The cultural resources these panellists drew on when writing their responses 
to MO – including the category of the vote as ‘debt’, ‘privilege’, and ‘responsibility’, or the 
storyline that ‘both sides’ had ‘pros and cons’ to be weighed ‘on balance’ – were shared by a 
wide range of panellists. They were presumably circulating widely in British society at the 
time. Therefore, it is plausible that such cultural resources were used by many citizens, far 
beyond the MO panel, to construct their opinions and votes. 
 
4) Unhelpful campaigns 
In some ways, the panellists quoted in Section 3 sound rather trusting of politics. They trust in 
democracy, in so far as they see voting as important. They trust politicians and government, in 
so far as they see issues like membership of the EU as best decided by citizens’ representatives, 
and not citizens themselves. However, there is one part of politics in which most MO panellists 
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clearly did lack trust, or came to distrust over time: the referendum campaign – and this was 
important because how else were uncertain, ill-informed, hand-wringing citizens meant to form 
opinions and decide how to vote if not by engaging with the campaign? 
 Many panellists looked to the campaign for help, at least initially. They read leaflets 
and newspapers, watched television, and listened to the radio. Fairly quickly, however, they 
came to realise that the campaign would not provide them with what they were seeking. They 
wanted facts about what would happen in the event of Britain either leaving or remaining in 
the EU, but they came to realise that such facts were not available. Only speculation was 
available. A self-employed professional in his 40s from Southeast England (D4736) bemoaned 
the lack of ‘factual evidence’ and the ‘speculation’. For him, this speculation was no better than 
‘misinformation’. For other panellists, including a carer in his 30s from Northeast England 
(N5744), speculation was usually ‘mere speculation’ (emphasis added). A community health 
worker in her 40s from the East Midlands (T4715) was disappointed that ‘neither side can 
categorically and truthfully say what will happen’. The problem was put clearly by a student 
in his 20s from Northwest England (S5780): ‘It is impossible to have facts about the future. 
There can only be speculation’. 
 A storyline repeated time and again across the MO panel was that ‘no one knows’ what 
will happen as a result of Britain remaining in or leaving the EU. After following the campaign, 
a retired film writer in his 70s from Scotland (H1541) concluded that ‘no one really knows 
anything’. This phrase was repeated three times at different points in just this one campaign 
diary. Variations of the phrase were repeated by other panellists. ‘There’s simply no way of 
knowing what will happen if the UK votes for Brexit’, wrote a civil servant in his 50s from 
Northeast England (M3190). Also in her 50s, a retired teacher (M3412) wrote: ‘no one has any 
real knowledge or true idea of just what the outcome would be if we left. How can anyone 
know?’. Also now retired, a former journalist in her 70s from Northeast England (W633) wrote: 
‘No one will know just how, for example, exports, currency movements, and trade treaties will 
be affected by leaving unless and until we actually do so […] Brexit is a pig in a poke, but so 
too is Remain’. 
 Another common storyline, shared by many panellists, was that facts and knowledge in 
the campaign had necessarily been replaced by speculation, but also claims, counter-claims, 
and accusations (usually of scare-mongering) – few of which could be verified and trusted. 
Consider this from the referendum diary of a student in his 20s from Northwest England 
(S5780): ‘The problem is that I just don’t know what’s true. [Andrew] Neil says that we 
couldn’t nationalise the railways if we stayed in the EU. [Hillary] Benn says we could. Neil 
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suggests TTIP might threaten the NHS. Benn says that it won’t’. And consider this from the 
diary of a retired film writer in his 70s from Scotland (H1541): 
 
The reaction by the Leave campaign to the Treasury’s 200-page report was 
incandescent and much use was made of allegations that ‘the fear factor’ and 
incomprehensibility were replacing reality and facts. The attacks were led by 
Justice Secretary Michael Gove, whose contributions were just as instantly 
condemned by Labour’s First Secretary Angela Eagle as ‘complete utopian 
rubbish’. [Dominic Grieve] appeared on The Today Programme on Radio 4 
shortly after Michael Gove to denounce his claims about the European Court of 
Justice undermining the UK’s security as ‘unfounded and untenable’ […] Just a 
few weeks ago, a former head of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove, argued that ‘Brexit 
would bring two potentially important security gains […]’. This weekend, two 
other former security chiefs – Sir John Sawers of MI6 and Lord Evans of MI5 – 
have pitched their tent on the other side of the barricade. 
 
These diarists were describing what another panellist, a retired journalist in her 70s from 
Northeast England (W633), called ‘Newton’s law of politics: for every claim, there is an equal 
and opposite claim’. Most of the MO panellists noted this characteristic of the campaign. There 
were ‘claims and counter-claims’ that became ‘increasingly hard to decipher and believe’ 
(H1541), ‘endless claims and counter-claims’ that ‘make it impossible to detect the truth from 
the lies’ (S5767), and ‘claims and counter-claims becoming ever more hyperbolic’ (M3190). 
Many diaries were structured to reflect this: ‘On the one hand […] But then on the other hand 
[…] Who is to be believed?’ (M5770). ‘One local MP (Labour) says […] But another local 
Labour MP has said […]’ (V3773). Panellists generally found this ‘to and fro’ (R3032) 
character of the campaign frustrating. ‘Each time one politician […] makes a point’, wrote a 
retired teacher in her 50s (M3412), ‘there is someone from the opposition who is more than 
ready to ridicule the point’. Similarly, a retired civil servant in his 70s from Wales (R3032) 
wrote: ‘As soon as one side of the argument produces, for example, a list of prominent business 
people who support their side, the other side produces their list’. ‘Who do we believe?’, asked 
our retired journalist in her 70s from Scotland (W633), when ‘figures are quoted by both 
campaigns […], each contradicting the other’. 
 It would help if there had been what many panellists described as a source or mediator 
that was independent, reliable, impartial – but apparently none could be found. A carer in his 
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30s from Northeast England (N5744) wrote: ‘It would be nice to find reliable and unbiased 
sources of data about the subject so that I could make an educated guess’. Also from Northeast 
England, a retired civil servant in his 50s (M3190) complained ‘that there’s no completely 
disinterested and impartial person, institution, or corpus of knowledge out there to whom 
appeals for advice and accurate information on the merits and drawbacks of EU membership 
can be directed’. For our retired film writer in his 70s from Scotland (H1541), not even the 
BBC was playing this role. It just reported ‘bipolar partisan claims without question’, such that 
‘the listener is left with views from completely opposite viewpoints, with little exposure to 
mediation or moderating enquiry’. 
 Where did all this claim and counter-claim leave our already reluctant and uncertain 
panellists? They were left with ‘pros and cons for each opinion’, but ‘no conclusive arguments 
from either side’ (E5014). They were given ‘arguments for and arguments against’, but ‘no 
clear better argument’ (S5816). Finding themselves with ‘no right or wrong answer’ (N5744) 
and no ‘smoking gun’ (E5014), how did panellists respond? Many remained uncertain in their 
opinions. ‘I just don’t know what to think’, wrote a student in his 20s from Northwest England 
(S5780) towards the end of his diary. Another student in his 20s, this time from Southeast 
England (M5770), recounted the competing claims he had heard, wrote ‘it is hard to know what 
to believe’, and concluded just before polling day: ‘It is for this reason that I am unsure which 
side I want to vote for’. Some panellists despaired at being left in this position and the quality 
of the campaign. Long before polling day, a teacher in her 60s from Scotland wrote (W729): 
‘I’ve lost the will to live. I am sending in this Directive now, not later. Sick, sick of politicians 
and their claims and counter-claims’. Of the campaign, with its apparently endless diet of 
speculations and accusations, a charity worker in his 30s from Northeast England (J5734) 
wrote: 
 
I have grown old in its service. And now it seems that all my children will ever 
know is the sound of grown men yelling ‘Hitler’ at each other and debating just 
how many hypothetical beans hypothetical cows will fetch in an abstractly 
imagined future […] Could we all just put rocks in our pockets and walk into the 
sea? 
 
This panellist arrived at polling day in despair. Other panellists responded to the unhelpful 
campaign by disengaging. After all the ‘lies and misinformation’, a self-employed professional 
in his 40s from Southeast England (D4736) described himself as ‘baffled and disengaged’. 
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Also in his 40s, an administrator from the West Midlands (B3227) reported how ‘the constant 
reiteration of each side’s accusations and counter-accusations (many of them hypothetical) has 
had a numbing effect on me’. Signing off his referendum diary, a civil servant in his 50s from 
Southwest England (E5014) wrote: ‘I’ve finally concluded that it doesn’t matter which way 
the vote goes’. 
And yet we know that most panellists did end up voting, just like most citizens beyond 
the MO panel – many of whom, it is reasonable to assume, were also familiar with categories 
like ‘facts’, ‘mere speculation’, and ‘claims/counter-claims’, and storylines including the one 
about no one knowing what will happen, the one about it being impossible to know what to 
believe, and the one about there being ‘pros and cons’ for each side and no clear best option. 
These were the prominent cultural resources offered to citizens by a context of low political 
trust during the 2016 campaign. So the question remains: if not by calculation – by slowly 
establishing the facts and assessing the costs and benefits – how did voters in the referendum 
eventually form their opinions and determine their vote? 
 
5) Recourse to feelings and elite cues 
We have seen that many panellists felt a responsibility to vote in the 2016 referendum, but were 
uncertain of their opinion on Brexit and found the campaign unhelpful when seeking to perform 
this difficult task. We now turn to how some panellists finally managed to develop a position, 
allowing them to act – though still with uncertainty and hesitancy in many cases. If panellists 
could not know the consequences of voting Leave or Remain (‘no one knows’), they gradually 
realised they could know other things on which to base their vote – not as a preferred mode of 
decision-making, but as a last resort. Specifically, they could know their own feelings, beliefs, 
principles, and visions for the future, and they could take a view on who they wanted to be 
aligned with – which politicians and other prominent figures in the campaign – and, crucially, 
who they were against. 
 Let us begin with feelings, a term we use loosely to capture the range of ways panellists 
made their decisions on the basis of not carefully weighed information about consequences, 
but a rather vague sense of what feels right, what is right to believe, and what broad principles 
are right to uphold (cf. Moss et al 2020). Sometimes, panellists used the term ‘feeling’ itself. 
For example,  an engineering works manager in his 50s from Southwest England (S5915) wrote 
this when justifying his Leave vote: ‘My basic wish was to regain what I felt was a sense of 
destiny, rather than being forced to accept the resolve of unelected people in Europe’. Similarly, 
an author in her 30s from Scotland (J4793) wrote this when justifying her Remain vote: ‘I’ll 
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admit to not knowing so much about all that goes on within the EU and all that it involves for 
a member state, but […] it feels better to be part of something, contributing to something 
bigger, than peering in from the outside […] I voted for unity and shared resources’. 
 These panellists were falling back on rather abstract notions like destiny and unity. 
Sometimes, they discussed this in terms of ‘beliefs’. Here are two Remain voters on why they 
voted that way: ‘I voted Remain […] My belief that nations ultimately work better when they 
are united together led to my vote’ (B5178); ‘I voted Remain. It wasn’t influenced by a 
particular issue but it was an inherent belief that we should be part of something bigger’ 
(H5210). Alternatively, they discussed it in terms of ‘principles’ and what is generally right 
and wrong. Here are two Leave voters on why they voted that way: ‘I recall being distinctly 
unimpressed by the campaigning of either side. I could see pros and cons of each outcome […] 
In the end, I think my main influence was principle: simply the principle of self-rule’ (T5672); 
‘The most important issue that influenced my vote […] was that I felt it’s wrong to pay 
someone in Brussels to tell me what I can and can’t do’ (R3546). 
 Panellists were looking around for something to guide their opinion and vote. They 
were struggling to find what they wanted: reliable facts about what would happen in the event 
of Brexit or Remain. They were, however, finding something else. These could be feelings, 
beliefs, or principles. They could be something rather modest like the rule of thumb used by 
this self-employed professional in his 40s from Southeast England (D4736): ‘There is so much 
uncertainty about the outcome of leaving that I would urge caution and stick with it. Better the 
Devil you know’. Or they could be something rather grand like the ‘vision for Britain’ used by 
this retired nursery teacher in her 60s from the West Midlands (M3408): 
 
Nobody deals in facts about how this country may look in five or ten years’ time, 
because nobody can predict the future in regard to any of the major issues at stake 
[…] I haven’t actually learnt anything concrete about the better choice. I have, 
however, learnt a lot about what my vision for Britain in the future would be and 
which side of the argument is most in tune with my hopes. 
 
This panellist ended up voting Leave, but she didn’t begin 2016 as a Leaver and she didn’t vote 
Leave on the basis of ‘concrete facts’. Like the other panellists quoted in this section, she felt 
an obligation to form an opinion and vote, and, finding the political information provided by 
the campaign unhelpful, settled on a different way of determining her choice. This alternative 
way for many panellists involved clarifying their general beliefs and principles – researchers 
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may refer to these as ‘values’, but the MO panellists did not use that word – before feeling the 
fit between those criteria and their sense of Leave and Remain as positions, worldviews, and 
tribes. 
 This brings us to elite cues, because one of the ways this fit could be established – could 
be sensed as being ‘in tune’ – was by using the personalities involved in the campaign as a 
simple and quick proxy for the two positions on offer. In a context of low political trust, there 
were few if any panellists who followed the endorsements of politicians and voted a particular 
way. Instead, there were examples of panellists who followed the endorsements of non-
politicians, such as this pharmacist in her 50s from the West Midlands (V3773): 
 
I haven’t read all the leaflets or listened to all the comments […] because I don’t 
actually trust most of the leading campaigners or believe that any of their ‘facts’ 
are true, whichever side they’re on. So I have to look at what other people have 
said, and when I look at those who are in favour of remaining, they tend to be 
people I trust more than those who want to leave. 
 
The ‘other people’ referred to by this panellist included science writer Ben Goldacre and 
journalist Martin Lewis. The panellist didn’t write about their ‘facts’ or arguments for 
remaining in the EU – their message. She wrote about how she trusted them as messengers and 
voted Remain on that basis. 
 This panellist took what might be called ‘positive elite cues’ from non-politicians she 
trusted, but she also took ‘negative elite cues’ from campaigners, including politicians, she felt 
repelled by – an approach that was prevalent across much of the MO panel. She wrote: ‘Most 
of the better known fans of Leave seem to be rich or self-interested. Whatever their arguments 
(and I only have the gist of most of them), I just don’t think that they’re much like me’. Other 
panellists were also put off by those campaigning for Leave, who seemed unfamiliar, ‘shifty’, 
or worse – largely regardless of their ‘arguments’. ‘I was going to vote Brexit’, wrote a museum 
manager in his 60s from the East of England (A6056). ‘Then I noted that shifty characters like 
Farage, Gove, and Johnson were in favour of leaving, so I voted Remain’. Observing the Leave 
campaign, a retired film writer in his 70s from Scotland wrote: ‘I cannot imagine supporting 
anything they promoted’. This approach worked for panellists who voted Remain and also for 
panellists who voted Leave, including the civil servant in his 50s from Southwest England 
(E5014) who explained: ‘I found [David] Cameron and [George] Osborne the two most odious 
people alive, and the thought of upsetting their stupid little public school spat with their fellow 
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Tories was very appealing’. The negative-cues approach only hit problems when distrustful 
panellists found themselves pushed in two directions by endorsements from both sides. ‘My 
first thought is that if David Cameron and his cronies are in favour of staying in the EU, then 
the general public would be wise to vote to Leave’, wrote a carer in his 30s from Northeast 
England (N5744). ‘Then again’, he continued, ‘Boris Johnson […] is arguing that we should 
leave’. On the basis of negative elite cues, this panellist did not know which way to turn. They 
did, however, know one thing: ‘I guess what I’m saying is that my decision has been swayed 
on which way to vote by looking at which people are in favour of staying or leaving, and 
considering what I think of them’. As a reluctant, uncertain citizen, who nevertheless felt 
obliged to participate in the referendum, his vote had been swayed not by reliable political 
information, which the campaign had failed to provide, but by a series of judgements about 
individual politicians and other campaigners. Were they trustworthy? Were they like him? Did 
they share his values? These things could be known, in so far as they could be felt, even if the 
future consequences of Brexit or Remain could not be known. 
 
6) Discussion 
Our main aim in this article has been to understand more about how citizens form opinions and 
come to decisions as voters in a context of low political trust. To do this, we have used volunteer 
writing for MO. The diary format used by many panellists in response to MO directives on 
elections and referendums allows researchers to reconstruct what happens between the earlier 
demands made of panellists to think about an issue and the later act of voting. These diaries, 
we have argued, tell us about the understandings, contexts, and practices of MO panellists, but 
also many other citizens beyond the MO panel – so long as the panel is sampled to cover a 
broad range of geographical, political, and social positions, and the writing is analysed for 
cultural resources used by panellists from across these positions, indicating that such resources 
were circulating widely in society at the time in question. 
 By tracking the formation of public opinion, we found that a lot happens between the 
earlier demands made of citizens to think about an issue and the later act of voting. In discussion 
groups held just prior to the 2016 referendum, Andreouli and Nicholson (2018) found that 
many citizens were forming and reforming their positions by wrestling with dilemmas. 
Similarly, in MO sources, we found that many citizens developed opinions reluctantly, 
hesitantly, and uncertainly. They lacked strong views about issues like the EU and Brexit, but 
held strong views about voting, which they saw as a debt, privilege, and responsibility. Feeling 
this responsibility and finding themselves in a challenging task environment like the EU 
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Referendum, many citizens look for information so they can view themselves, and be viewed, 
as rational choosers. However, in a context of low political trust, campaigns often do not 
function to provide such information. Citizens want facts but receive ‘mere speculation’. 
Claims come accompanied by counter-claims. ‘Pros and cons’ build up for each side. Nothing 
conclusive is provided by campaigns. 
 In such cases, many citizens form opinions and make decisions by falling back on rather 
vague feelings about their own beliefs, principles, and visions, and the fit of these feelings with 
particular campaigns and especially campaigners. On both feelings and elite cues, we make an 
original contribution to the literature regarding their role and functioning in a context of low 
political trust. Taking feelings first, in the literature on Euroscepticism (e.g. Hobolt et al 2011) 
it is often claimed that Euroscepticism has become increasingly based on political-cultural 
feelings instead of cost-benefit calculations because the EU has developed from a free market 
into a political union, which has brought questions of sovereignty and national identity to the 
fore. This may be so, but our study has found another explanation for the reliance on feelings 
by citizens taking a view on EU membership and many other issues in recent years. In a context 
of low political trust where facts are disputed, predictions of consequences are dismissed as 
mere speculation or fear-mongering, and it is difficult to know who to believe, one thing a 
citizen can know is their own feelings – especially regarding their own beliefs, principles, and 
visions; and especially regarding individual personalities associated with certain positions and 
campaigns. 
 Turning to elite cues, most of the literature on these particular heuristics assumes a 
context of high political trust and a positive relationship between elite endorsements and voting 
patterns. This was the context for King’s (1977) study of the 1975 Referendum on the Common 
Market. At a time of negligible ‘anti-establishment mood’, he found that voters ‘followed the 
leader’ and backed ‘Yes’ because that was largely what the two main parties – and especially 
the party leaders –recommended. By contrast, in the current period of low political trust, we 
found something quite different. We found evidence that elite cues drove decision-making in 
the 2016 referendum – something also found by other studies (Clarke et al 2017b, Hobolt 
2016). Beyond that, we found that negative elite cues were particularly important in driving 
votes for both Leave and Remain. Voters used particular politicians as proxies not for positions 
they wished to support, but for positions they wished to vote against. 
Reflecting on these findings and the literature reviewed at the top of this paper, it seems 
that a context of political distrust favours fast-thinking heuristics over slow-thinking cost-
benefit analysis. In the terms of Hooghe and Marks (2005), it favours ‘community’ and ‘cues’ 
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over ‘calculation’. This holds if we take ‘community’ to mean feelings of national identity and 
belonging, as Hooghe and Marks do, but also feelings regarding beliefs, principles, and visions 
more generally. It also holds if we take ‘cues’ to mean negative elite cues, as opposed to the 
positive cues of elite endorsements. 
Finally, we consider the question of how the EU Referendum result and associated 
polling results might be interpreted. Since many opinions and votes were based on vague 
feelings and negative elite cues, and were arrived at reluctantly, hesitantly, and uncertainly, 
claims regarding what people think about the EU or Brexit should be treated with caution. This 
includes the claims of populists about ‘the will of the people’, but also those of pollsters and 
political scientists about polarisation.  
There are two main positions on polarisation in the literature. One is that long-term 
polarisation – social, economic, cultural – produced the conditions for the referendum and 
result (Ford and Goodwin 2017, Goodhart 2017, Norris and Inglehart 2019). The second is that 
polarisation between Leave and Remain identities was actually produced by the referendum, 
campaign, outcome, and aftermath (Curtice 2018, Hobolt et al 2020). Sobolewska and Ford 
(2020) combine these two positions. They argue that polarisation of ‘identity liberals’ and 
‘identity conservatives’ was driven by long-term demographic and social changes, and 
exploitation of the issue of immigration by UKIP, followed by the referendum campaign and 
result, leading the UK to ‘Brexitland’ (a divided nation that became conscious of its divisions). 
The immediate evidence from our study would seem to put our argument nearer the 
position that polarisation was produced by the EU Referendum. But we think it takes us beyond 
that position, with important implications for UK politics. We have evidence that people ended 
up voting for one particular side of the divide often because of strongly held negative views 
about the other. But we have little evidence that people held strong and positive views about 
their own side – or even that they saw it as ‘their own side’. A diagnosis of polarisation requires 
a divided people not only detached from ‘the other side’, but also attached to their own side. In 
the absence of strong in-group attachments, we suggest there is a lot of work being done by the 
generalised lack of trust in politics and that is key to understanding how UK politics will unfold 
rather than polarisation. 
As noted, the 1975 Referendum took place in a context not of anger and resentment of 
the establishment, but of deference or acquiescence to leaders who were largely followed by 
voters. The 2016 Referendum took place in a very different environment. The strongest divide 
in British politics is between ‘us’ (the people) and ‘them’ (the elite), not the gap between 
Remainers and Leavers. The tactical game for leaders and parties is to focus on issues where 
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us versus them can be mobilised in their favour. The Leave campaign did that more effectively 
in the referendum campaign through rhetoric such as ‘take back control’ and ‘people have had 
enough of experts’, and in framing of the post-referendum slowness of the UK Parliament to 
honour the result, culminating in Boris Johnson’s pledge to ‘get Brexit done’ in the 2019 
election campaign – pitching the Conservatives against an out-of-touch parliamentary elite that 
was obstructing the will of the people. Britain’s politics is currently framed as much by who 
can mobilise anti-establishment and more broadly anti-politics sentiment, as by polarisation 
along cultural lines. 
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The EU Referendum. Is Britain stronger in Europe or should the nation vote to leave the European 
Union? Will you vote? Do you feel that your vote counts? If you don’t intend to vote please explain 
why. What are the key issues for the UK? Are there any issues that are particularly important to 
you and will affect how you vote? Has membership of the EU benefited you, your local area or the 
UK? Or has it been a disadvantage? What are your hopes and fears for the UK after the referendum 
is over? Have you been following the news coverage? What do you make of the campaigns and 
declarations made by politicians, business leaders, and others who publicly speak about the 
referendum? In the weeks running up to the referendum, log how your opinions change as the 
campaigns develop. You might just want to record a few words to express how you feel, or write 
something longer. It would be useful if you could note down if any news coverage about the 
referendum alters your thinking. 
Summer 
2017 
The EU Referendum: One Year on. What was the most important issue or issues influencing your 
vote in the EU Referendum? How did you choose to vote? How do you think or feel about that 
issue or issues one year later? What do you feel the impact of leaving the EU will be on these 
issues? Please tell us if you have any concerns and if so, why. Did the EU Referendum change the 
way you see yourself and other people? If yes, in what way/s? Did this come as a surprise? Has 
the EU Referendum affected any relationships you have, for example within your family, friends, 
colleagues, or other people in your community? If so, please explain in what way/s? How has the 
EU Referendum affected (if at all) where you feel you belong? We are interested to know your 
thoughts and experiences, for example with regards to family, to the area in which you live and/or 
communities or groups you have been part of. Do you think that prejudice is more prominent in 
UK society since the referendum? If so, do you feel that this has had any impacts on people’s 
individual or community safety and social, regional or cultural divisions within society? Since the 
EU Referendum, have your views about immigration changed in any way? If yes, please explain 
why and in what ways/s? Have your views about UK politics changed more generally in any way? 
If yes, please explain why and in what ways/s? What are your hopes and expectations for the 
negotiations? Do you feel more or less optimistic about the future since the EU Referendum? If 





Appendix B: Panellists quoted in the paper 
Ref. No. Age Gender Occupation Region Leave/Remain 
A6056 67 M Museum manager E of England R 
B3227 49 M Administrator W Midlands R 
B5178 45 F Special education needs support assistant Y&H R 
B5702 25 F Machine operator NW R 
C4988 63 M Retired nurse E Midlands R 
C5692 40 F Sales ledger controller N Ireland R 
D4736 49 M Self-employed professional SE R 
E5014 50 M Civil servant SW R 
H1541 71 M Retired film writer Scotland R 
H2639 75 F Retired library assistant E of England L 
H5210 25 F Communications manager E Midlands R 
J1890 84 F Shop assistant Y&H L 
J4793 35 F Writer Scotland R 
J5734 31 M Charity worker NE R 
M2061 85 F Retired nurse E Midlands L 
M3190 57 M Retired civil servant NE R 
M3408 69 F Retired nursery teacher W Midlands L 
M3412 56 F Retired teacher - R 
M5770 21 M Student SE R 
N5744 38 M Carer NE L 
R3032 74 M Retired civil servant Wales R 
R3546 52 M Locksmith Y&H L 
R5429 40 F Self-employed NE R 
S5767 31 F Researcher London R 
S5780 22 M Student NW R 
S5816 41 F Museum worker Y&H - 
S5915 56 M Engineering works manager SW L 
T4715 44 F Community health worker E Midlands R 
T5672 33 M Finance manager SW L 
V3773 53 F Pharmacist W Midlands R 
W633 73 F Retired journalist NE L 
W729 60 F Teacher Scotland L 
 
